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Dual-use concerns – that legitimate
research has the potential to be misused –
are inherent in life sciences research. In the
past 15 years, numerous scientific papers
have raised security questions, and split
opinions of scientists, ethicists, and poli-
cymakers on whether the research should
have been performed or published. Some
of the most high-profile examples include
the addition of an immunomodulatory
gene into the mousepox virus genome,
which made the mousepox vaccine ineffec-
tive (and suggested that similar manipula-
tions to the smallpox virus genome could
make the smallpox vaccine ineffective); the
synthesis of poliovirus, the 1918 influenza
strain, and the synthesis of a bacterial
cell; and “gain of function” (GOF) work
on influenza viruses to explore whether
H5N1 and other strains have the potential
to become transmissible in humans (1–6).
Given the increasing ease of manipulating
and synthesizing genetic material, and the
continued expansion of biological research
globally, additional dual-use concerns are
certain to arise in the future.
In response to these challenges, poli-
cies have been developed in the US to
allow a thoughtful pause before beginning
or publishing specific areas of research, to
consider which aspects of the research are
potentially problematic, and evaluate what
can be done to mitigate concerns. (7, 8)
Though such policies may become more
common in biological research, it will be
difficult to create hard-and-fast rules about
whether or not to conduct potentially dual-
use research and publish it in the open sci-
entific literature, because what to do about
the work is inextricably tied to the specifics
of the research in question. Decisions of
whether to fund, perform research on, or
publish the next dual-use research of con-
cern article, whether it involves influenza,
a different pathogen, or something that is
not a pathogen at all, will likely be tipped
one way or another by a mix of quali-
ties that are difficult to predict. Some of
these qualities are the technical specifics
of the research in question; the researchers
involved; the urgency of the public health
threat that the research is trying to address;
an assessment of the danger that the infor-
mation could be applied toward a bio-
logical weapon; and an assessment of the
soundness or importance of the research.
It is unlikely that in considering these fac-
tors, consensus will emerge about what
the right course of action should be, or
agreement about whether the work will
yield important scientific or public health
advances. The lack of consensus may lead
to some types of work not being funded by
one government but pursued by another,
or journals with different standards for
publication.
Some dual-use research raises concerns,
however that can be more easily and
broadly addressed than the potential for
misuse: the potential for accident. The lab-
oratories, which first demonstrated that
H5N1 avian influenza has the potential
to become transmissible in mammals have
high levels of biosafety training, top-of-
the-line equipment, engineered controls,
and health monitoring of the researchers
performing the work. Yet as GOF influenza
research is repeated elsewhere, or even
becomes commonplace, how can people be
assured that the same level of attention will
be paid? Biosafety is particularly impor-
tant in these cases because of the poten-
tial of an accident to spark a pandemic.
Most accidents in biological laboratories
are likely to be limited to the researchers
involved and possibly their close con-
tacts, but laboratory acquired infections
with transmissible pathogens, such as non-
circulating human influenza strains, SARS,
or engineered influenza strains could have
consequences that go well beyond the lab-
oratory (9, 10).
The good news is that safety is
more objectively measured than dual-use
research, and there are practical systems
to put into place that could raise confi-
dence that concerns are being addressed.
There is excellent guidance available for
individual researchers, laboratories, and
research institutions to adhere to high
biosafety practices, as well as biosafety
professional training. There are interna-
tional standards for BSL-1, BSL-2, BSL-3,
and BSL-4 labs including what engineer-
ing controls should be in place in each level
of biocontainment, as well as to manage
biorisks within a research institution. (11,
12) The World Health Organization, the
Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, professional organizations, and other
institutions aim to bring technical infor-
mation to practitioners, enhance labora-
tory safety practice, and promote biosafety
standards (13–17).
Yet while technical guidance for
researchers and institutions is in abun-
dance, a key piece is missing: national-level
norms for the safety systems necessary
to perform such consequential research,
to make biosafety a political priority.
The next time there is concern about
GOF or some other potentially concern-
ing research, it would be helpful to know
that the research took place in an environ-
ment where there are national standards
for the work, including for equipment
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maintenance, worker safety training, health
monitoring, surveillance, and other myr-
iad activities to help keep the researchers
and the larger public safe, and that the
nation has an adequate surveillance sys-
tem in place to identify and limit potential
outbreaks that could result from such acci-
dents. Without national-level standards for
biosafety and interest in making sure that
research institutions that perform poten-
tially high-consequence research adhere to
those standards, there will remain insuf-
ficient incentives to commit the resources
required to achieve high levels of biosafety
in individual laboratories and institutions.
The problem of setting biosafety stan-
dards for GOF work and other, dual-use
research with the potential for consequen-
tial accidents does not address the dual-use
dilemma in the life sciences, in that such
research may lower barriers toward mak-
ing a biological weapon. But, for legitimate
scientific research, increasing international
accountability for safety could raise bar-
riers to accidentally achieving the same,
horrible result. Even the most dangerous
pathogen cannot cause harm to popula-
tions if it does not escape containment.
Nations which fund this type of scientific
research should therefore have the systems
in place to provide appropriate levels of
safety.
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